Introduction
Minimum income protection (MIP) provides cash benefits of last resort across Europe. It is the generosity of these means-tested social assistance benefits and thus their capacity to ameliorate or even eradicate poverty that most often draws the attention of both scientists and policy makers (Cantillon et al., 2008 , Nelson, 2010 , Nelson, 2003 . Indeed, benefit levels are a crucial dimension for poverty alleviation. In order to be eligible for benefits, however, individuals usually have to fulfill a number of conditions, i.e. certain criteria of eligibility, and those conditions may vary for different groups of recipients, leading to categorically differentiated systems of MIP or specific treatment of certain recipient groups within one MIP scheme.
While general social assistance schemes and those catering to able-bodied people of working age have extensively been analyzed in comparative perspective (Immervoll, 2009 , van Mechelen et al., 2011 , Nelson, 2010 ) studies on other types of MIP benefits are rare (one exception is, e.g., Goedemé"s study of MIP for the elderly in this volume). Categorical differentiation as such has not been investigated in a broad comparative perspective so far, both across countries and various recipient groups. The purpose of this chapter is to study the categorical differentiation of minimum income benefits in Europe, linking the organization of benefit programs to the cultural norms that form public attitudes on benefit recipients. It is expected that views about the deservingness of claimants influence minimum income benefits in a multitude of ways, which makes them relevant for explaining program regulation in terms of access and generosity. The study focuses on two types of MIP programs that can be placed on the two endpoints of the continuum of deservingness perceptions: minimum income benefits for immigrants and the disabled, thus providing excellent opportunities to initiate a discussion about deservingness perceptions and the organization of policy in the area of minimum income protection. Each type of benefit will be contrasted to the organization of the general minimum income benefit in order answer the question of whether existing categorical differentiations follow the lines of deservingness perceptions.
The starting point of the analysis is a review of Clasen and Clegg"s (2007) work on conditionality in unemployment benefits, which is also suitable for analyzing eligibility criteria in MIP systems. We then go on to highlight how these criteria might be connected to cultural norms and deservingness perceptions. A grid is developed which combines both lines of research in order to show how institutional differentiation along the lines of perceived deservingness of recipient groups might function. The following sections look at existing institutional arrangements in Europe. First, a general quantitative overview of European patterns of categorical differentiation is given. Next, the analytical grid is applied to institutional arrangements for immigrants and people with disabilities. The concluding section discusses the empirical results in the light of the research questions.
Conditionality and deservingness perceptions: Towards an explorative framework for cross-national comparisons
Minimum income protection schemes are highly selective. They operate in societies with finite resources, and they support people who cannot make ends meet on their own. MIP schemes rely on means tests as a core principle in order to ensure that benefits only go to people who really need help. These means tests pose two questions: First, who is needy enough to receive a benefit, and second, how much money do they need (Rothstein, 1998) ?
The application of the means test thus leads to clearly delineated groups, those of net payers and benefit recipients. Those who pay taxes finance the benefits, and those who receive them belong to separate and clearly identifiable groups. Due to this institutional setup, MIP schemes are on the forefront of societal debate about the relation between societal solidarity and reciprocity. While rich societies do have the means to support their poorer members, there are also certain expectations directed towards benefit recipients. The legitimacy of MIP schemes is dependent upon the institutionally implemented balance between solidarity and reciprocity. Therefore, the conditionality that is "written into the design of all social programmes" (Clasen and Clegg, 2007: 167) is of particular importance for MIP. The conditions that benefit claimants have to fulfill on various levels are constantly re-negotiated in the political process to accommodate societal and fiscal conditions, as they express the "societal solidarity contract" (Mau, 2002: 350, own translation) , that is, what society is willing to give and what it expects in return. Changes of these conditions can be used to either widen the number of potential claimants or to reduce it and thus to influence expenditure on MIP schemes. Clasen and Clegg (2007) have developed a concept for the analysis of social benefits that strongly relies on the concept of conditionality. Their grid distinguishes between three different levels at which conditions are applied. The first level determines "conditions of category". It defines which categories of people are in principle eligible for benefits and thus determines the borderlines of membership in a certain social protection scheme (see Mohr, 2007) . Whether an individual is entitled to benefits depends on his or her personal characteristics, e.g., being a national or long-term resident of the country, being in a certain age bracket or having a proven disability. As Goedemé (2012) puts it: "Conditions of category answer the question who, in theory, is protected by the social protection scheme" (INSERT page number). As an example, one needs to have reached the statutory pension age in order to be eligible for a pension benefit. Below that specific age, one does not fulfill the basic condition of category, namely belonging to a certain age group. Policy makers can use the statutory pension age as a "lever" for either raising or lowering the number of potential pensioners. If the pension age is raised, less people will be eligible for a pension. If it is lowered, more people are going to draw an old-age pension.
Once a person fulfills those conditions of category -or personal prerequisites, "conditions of circumstance" are examined in a second stage. These conditions aim to assess whether an individual in principle eligible for a certain benefit is really entitled to it. If an individual has reached the retirement age, for example, he or she is only entitled for a contributory pension if he or she has contributed to the scheme over a certain minimum period of time, e.g. five years. Again, policy makers may use requirements such as this minimum period needed to draw a pension benefit in order to narrow or widen the potential circle of benefit recipients. If the minimum period is prolonged, e.g. to six years, less people will be eligible for a contributory pension, if it is shortened to four years, more people will be able to draw a benefit. For MIP schemes, the conditions of the means test are an important "lever" for assessing whether a claimant is eligible for a benefit. The lower the income threshold for the means test, the less people will fulfill the conditions for benefit receipt, and benefit levels are correspondingly low. If claimants" income is tested against a more generous threshold, more people will qualify to receive the benefit and the benefit will be higher. MIP schemes catering to different groups may use different varieties of means testing, for example including or excluding the extended family or applying either more or less generous disregards of income and assets.
Third, "conditions of conduct" may be applied to benefit recipients. This dimension is mostly relevant for beneficiaries of unemployment and MIP benefits. It refers to obligations to actively look for a job, the types of jobs recipients have to take up as well as activation and integration measures they have to participate in or the time interval within which the situation of recipients is being reviewed by the agency administering the benefit. MIP benefits in particular raise doubts about recipients" willingness to work because benefit receipt is not tied to any prior efforts of recipients. The conditions of conduct aim to test their attitude towards work and their capacity to reciprocate society"s support.
Overall, the degree to which the receipt of social benefits is subject to certain conditions is closely connected to the question of who is deemed as worthy of help. Research on the perceived deservingness of potential benefit recipients shows that there is a "universal dimension of support" that distinguishes groups perceived as more deserving from others with lower perceived desert. The public sees elderly people as worthiest of support, followed by the sick and disabled, families with children, and the unemployed (Coughlin, 1980 , see also Blekesaune and Quadagno, 2003 , for a comprehensive overview of the literature see van Oorschot, 2006) . A study using the 1999/2000 wave of the European Values Survey showed that the rank order was identical in in 23 European countries (with the qualification that in 6 countries, the sick and the disabled were seen just as deserving of support as the elderly), with immigrants -newly introduced as another group to be judged as to its degree of deservingness -ranging last, after unemployed people (van Oorschot, 2006) .
The remarkable stability of results both across countries and over time probably points to a deeply rooted and widely shared values system underlying both welfare state attitudes and welfare state institutions. There are a number of criteria established in the literature on the values that form public judgments on deservingness. First, the public is likely to ask whether those who need help are those "who belong" (Christensen and Malmstedt, 2000: 72) , using the criterion of identity (van Oorschot, 2000, see also Cook, 1979 , de Swaan, 1988 . In modern societies, "identity" can be connected to citizenship or belonging to a certain ethnic group. A second important criterion is that of control over the situation that led to the need of help (ibid), the actual level of need is another criterion. Finally, attitude (connected to Cook"s gratefulness and de Swaan"s "docility") and reciprocity play a role for the public"s judgment on the deservingness of various groups of benefit recipients. "Attitude" refers to the "smile of thanks", the behavior of those in need of help. "Reciprocity" refers to what those in need of help have done for society or are likely to do in the future (see also Albrekt Larsen, 2006 , Raven et al., 2011 These deservingness criteria tie in closely with Clasen"s and Clegg"s levels of conditionality. The question of identity is connected to the conditions of category. People with a lower perceived deservingness such as immigrants might be excluded from certain benefits on the basis of not belonging to the in-group, for example. The conditions of circumstance address recipients" level of need and the level of control they have over their situation. People who do not have control over the circumstances that cause their situation of need, e.g., older people or people with disabilities, might have access to more generous benefits. Finally, conditions of conduct may apply to help demonstrate that recipients of benefits show the right "attitude" and are willing to reciprocate what society does for them. Table 1 details how the different levels and levers of conditionality (Clasen and Clegg, 2007) are connected to deservingness criteria. Clasen and Clegg (2007) and van Oorschot (2000) .
When we interpret the ranking of recipient groups from the perspective of the deservingness criteria spelled out above, it is hardly surprising that the elderly and sick and disabled people march at the top: They cannot do anything about their age or their illness, and therefore, they are seen worthy of support. Moreover, they demonstrably belong to "us" -"they are our parents", as van Oorschot (2000: 37) points out -and have done a lot for society during their working lives. Doubts about the deservingness of unemployed people and people on social assistance are much harder to dispel on the ground of those criteria. The public may doubt whether they might not be working because they chose not to; their lifestyles and work ethics may be seen as deviant. The deservingness of immigrants is even harder to establish, as they may be seen as both "in control" of their situation, that is, as themselves to blame (e.g., Niemelä, 2008) and not belonging to "us"; therefore, it is hardly surprising that they are last in the ranking across all European countries.
Given this "universal dimension of support", it is reasonable to expect that the values underlying it in some way impact the development of the welfare state and the institutional setup of concrete social protection systems. The temporal sequence of the institutionalization of social protection schemes makes the impact of deservingness perceptions plausible.
Programmes for groups that rank highest on the "universal dimension of support" have been institutionalized earlier than programmes that cater to groups that are deemed less deserving.
So, pension schemes were usually the first programmes that were introduced, followed by work accident schemes and sick pay. Only at later stages of welfare state development, unemployment benefits and social assistance (in that case, if at all) have been institutionalized (Kangas, 2000) . The designs of welfare state programmes often also mirror the perceived deservingness of recipient groups. As van Oorschot (2006: 23) puts it:
For some groups, social protection is more easily accessible, more generous, longer lasting, and/or less subject to reciprocal obligations, than for other groups. Just a few examples make this clear: it is usually the case that elderly people and disabled people can rely more strongly on less stigmatizing benefits than, for instance, unemployed people; in many countries widows are better protected by national benefit schemes than are divorced women; mostly, core workers can rely on more generous and comprehensive social-insurance schemes than can peripheral workers; and job-seeking obligations attached to benefit receipt are usually more relaxed for older people and single parents. Now, if the general design of welfare states is influenced by deservingness perceptions, can we also pinpoint their influence on MIP schemes? The very early precursors of today"s MIP schemes, the English Poor Laws, for instance, or the German Armenfürsorge, made a strong distinction between the deserving, "helpless" poor and those who were considered capable of, but unwilling to work and thus undeserving of support (Kaufmann, 2003 , Powell, 1981 . For the latter group, help was only available in the workhouse and entailed the loss of civic rights (Fideler, 2006) . Until today, some distinction may be evident in categorically differentiated MIP schemes. As Handler and Hasenfeld (1991: 11) put it: "Social welfare policy cannot be fully understood without recognizing that it is fundamentally a set of symbols that try to differentiate between the deserving and undeserving poor." Assuming that there is indeed an impact of deservingness perceptions on the design of (categorically differentiated) MIP systems, what would it look like today?
Categorical differentiation of MIP systems with separate schemes for groups such as elderly people, people with disabilities and immigrants might be a sign of an influence of deservingness criteria, in particular if the different groups are confronted with different rules for entitlements (conditions of circumstance) and their behavior (conditions of conduct). A most obvious differentiation might be in benefit levels, that is, regarding "the quality of social inclusion" (Mohr, 2007) . Here, groups perceived as deserving, such as the elderly or disabled people, might receive higher benefits than young people, while immigrants might receive benefits at lower levels than those offered by the standard MIP scheme. Such variation in benefit levels across different groups of benefit recipients is highly visible and might therefore not always be an option that policy makers choose. Other aspects of MIP schemes such as eligibility criteria lend themselves to policy changes and differentiations as they are somewhat less visible to the eye of the public than obviously differentiated benefit levels or benefit cuts.
Even if categorically differentiated MIP schemes officially grant the same benefit levels, the actual benefit package can still differ due to varying eligibility criteria, income tapers, assets disregards and the like. Overall, we expect that the higher a group of recipients is placed on the "universal dimension of support", the less stringent the conditionality for the group in question should be.
The analyses of this chapter focus on the group perceived as least deservingimmigrants -and the group with one of the highest degrees of perceived deservingness, people with disabilities. If the hypothesized connection between deservingness perceptions and institutional setup exists, benefit schemes for immigrants should provide lower benefit levels than general MIP schemes and apply stricter means tests as well as harsher conditions regarding conduct. For disabled people, the opposite is true: Benefit levels can be expected to be above those in the general social assistance scheme, means tests are likely to be more generous, and there may be little conditionality in terms of conduct attached to benefit receipt.
Conditions of category might also imply more favorable conditions for immigrants who lived longer in a country than, e.g., newly-arrived asylum seekers. Also, more severely disabled people should benefit from higher benefit levels and weaker conditions of conduct. Table 2 gives an overview of how these categorical schemes are likely to differ from general social assistance schemes. 
A quantitative view on categorical differentiation
Before we move on to a more detailed analysis of MIP benefits for immigrants and disabled people, this section provides an overview of categorical differentiation of MIP systems in Europe (cf. Bahle et al., 2011) . More specifically, we will concentrate on the quantitative significance of categorical schemes in general and of those for immigrants and people with disabilities in particular. The information presented stems from the EuMin Database, which was developed at the Mannheim Centre for European Social Research (MZES). It contains information on MIP schemes in 16 European countries, namely all "old" EU member states apart from Greece, Italy and Luxembourg, and four "new" member states, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. EuMin is a data collection that combines national administrative information on institutional and quantitative matters with well-established comparative data on minimum income protection (e.g., SaMip, OECD Benefits and Wages, Missoc). The decision whether a social benefit was included in the database was based on a definition of MIP that is twofold: Benefits must guarantee a minimum standard of living and they have to be conditional on a means test. The information gathered according to these criteria provides a varied picture of MIP systems in Europe. Table 3 gives a broad overview of the degree of categorical differentiation in the 16 European countries by listing the number of schemes, the overall importance of MIP within the population and the quantitative share of the general MIP scheme as well as of the largest categorical scheme. Bahle, Hubl and Pfeifer (2011: 209) ; data on MIP systems stem from the EuMin database.
The degree to which MIP systems rely on categorically differentiated benefits varies widely across Europe. The Czech Republic and Slovakia both have only one MIP scheme that protects all groups in need. France with 10 schemes and Ireland with 13 schemes for various recipient groups form the other end of the continuum with highly differentiated MIP systems.
If MIP systems do offer various benefits beyond a general last safety net (or "residual" scheme), they often target groups such as elderly people, people with disabilities, unemployed people, single parents and refugees. Of course, schemes for other target groups exist, but usually they are of lesser importance in quantitative terms (e.g. the Irish benefits "prisoner"s wife"s allowance" and "farm assist" or the Dutch system for older, former self-employed people, to name but a few).
Whether categorical differentiation plays an important role in MIP depends to a large extent on the welfare state context. The Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands and to some extent the Czech Republic, for example, rely on (conditional) basic pensions based on longterm residency in the country (Goedemé, 2012) , which provide strong protection above the level of MIP; therefore, for the vast majority of elderly people, MIP does not play a role.
Basic pensions also exist in Ireland and the UK, and they cover a high share of the population.
These schemes, however, provide very low benefits which have to be topped up by MIP in many cases. In many Continental and Southern European countries, comprehensive pension provisions are lacking, and therefore poor pensioners are often covered by categorical MIP schemes. Similarly, the generous protection for (long-term) unemployed people in Denmark, Belgium, and to some degree, Austria, renders specific MIP schemes for the unemployed unnecessary, while in countries which lack strong protection for this group (e.g., Germany), categorical MIP schemes are more likely to exist.
The European countries, where MIP as a whole plays the most important role for the population are the United Kingdom and Ireland. They do, however, differ in terms of how differentiated their MIP systems are. While in Ireland, most social insurance benefits have their corresponding, assistance-based "twin", the UK only has four types of benefits in place.
The most important one is Income Support, which is intended for people unable to work for various reasons and constitutes the general last safety net. It deals with 55% of all MIP cases.
The second largest scheme is the benefit for the elderly, with 32.5%. In Ireland, the scheme for single parents is largest with around 28% of cases, followed by the scheme for the unemployed with around 17%. The residual scheme supplementary welfare allowance deals with around 6% of all MIP cases.
In the Continental European countries, between 5% and 10% of the population depend on MIP benefits. This high variance is also reflected by the level of differentiation: Austria"s MIP system consists of only three schemes, while France provides as much as ten different benefits for people in need. In France, around 37% of MIP recipients rely on the general last safety net, with the categorical benefit for elderly people dealing with around 17% of the caseload. In the Netherlands, the general scheme is even more important than in France.
Around 70% of all MIP recipients depend on it.
1 The largest categorical scheme targets young disabled people and deals with 19% of the cases, while there are also some residual schemes for older people with limited work ability. In Austria, 53% of all MIP recipients receive a categorical benefit that tops up contributory pensions (Ausgleichszulage), and around 36% of all MIP recipients rely on the (regionalized) residual benefit (which can also be used to top up low wage-related unemployment assistance benefits). In Belgium, around 27% of all MIP cases are dealt with in the residual scheme, while the largest scheme provides benefits to disabled people (34% of all cases), followed by the scheme for the elderly with around 30%. Germany"s scheme for the able-bodied working-age population Grundsicherung So far, little comparative research has been done that specifically addresses categorical MIP schemes. A reason might be that it is hard to clearly assign them to one specific type of policy. Although disability, for example, is a classical area of welfare state involvement, it is difficult to localize a distinct area of disability policy (Maschke, 2008) . Instead, the risk of work incapacity and/or dependency is approached within different spheres of social policy simultaneously. Even if a separate system of invalidity insurance exists, disability usually is also subject to other parts of social security such as health care, family benefits, the pension system or social assistance (Mabbett, 2005) . Statistical offices and scholars often choose the aspect of disability over the MIP function when defining and categorizing benefit schemes of last resort for the disabled. Eurostat and the OECD"s databases on social expenditure, for example, include information on MIP for the disabled in the category of disability benefits.
Although there is a differentiation between means-tested and non-means-tested benefits, categorical MIP benefits in these informational systems cannot be clearly separated from other means-tested benefits such as regular cash-for-care allowances. Accordingly, although comparative studies on disability policy do not necessarily fail to mention MIP for people with disabilities (OECD, 2003 , Maschke, 2008 , the institutional setup of these schemes, their specific function of providing a social minimum and their quantitative significance do not become clear. Analyzing the scope of MIP schemes for immigrants is even more difficult than in the case of disability benefits. In some cases, recipient numbers and expenditure are included in the category of general social assistance and sometimes, no exact information is available. One of the goals of the data collection at the MZES was to provide an overview of all types of MIP systems in one and the same source. For the disability benefits analyzed in this chapter, this goal was achieved. Regarding benefits for immigrants, the database only offers insights into the situation in Denmark, Germany and France and the UK. For France and the UK, information is only available on caseload but not for expenditure data are not available. Table 4 presents the quantitative information available on both types of MIP schemes, which will be studied in detail below. 
Categorical MIP schemes for immigrants
The programmes for immigrants in the five countries under analysis -Denmark, Sweden, Germany, France and the UK -have been introduced in the 1980s and 1990s/2000s, often as a reaction to increasing inflows of migrants, refugees and asylum seekers. In contrast to the general last safety nets and categorical benefits catering to groups such as elderly people or the unemployed, these schemes are much smaller and often protect very few people.
Conditions of category
Up to the beginning of the 2000s, refugees in Denmark could receive kontanthjaelp til flygtninge (cash benefit for refugees), which was essentially the same benefit as the regular social assistance benefit kontanthjaelp. In 2002, however, receipt of kontanthjaelp was made conditional upon a residency period of seven out of the last eight years in Denmark. Here, a "condition of category" was introduced that effectively excluded people who had recently arrived in Denmark from the receipt of the general MIP benefit. For the needs of immigrants who could not fulfil the residency requirement, two new benefits were introduced, introduktionsydelse and starthjaelp. Introduktionsydelse, or introductory benefit, is paid to immigrants from non-EU and non-Nordic countries and asylum seekers during the first three years of their stay in Denmark after gaining a residence permit. In order to be entitled to the benefit, claimants need to be unable to fend for themselves and should not be eligible for other social security benefits. Starthjaelp, the second programme, applies to all foreigners who arrived in Denmark after the July 1, 2002. It targets people who are neither from Nordic nor EU countries and who have lived more than three years in Denmark but do not fulfil the residency requirement of "seven out of last eight years" for the receipt of kontanthjaelp. This benefit also applies to Danes who have not lived in Denmark or in another EU country during the same period. Before those benefits become relevant, asylum seekers receive a "cash benefit" (kontante ydelse) that is intended to cover personal needs while recipients live in reception centres. As accommodation and meals (sometimes) are provided in the centres, most of the benefit is paid in kind.
Similar to Denmark, Sweden also has a cash benefit intended to cover the needs of asylum seekers living in reception centres directly after their arrival. Apart from this, immigrants can receive a benefit called introduktionsersättning (introductory benefit) once they have obtained a residence permit.
In Germany, asylum seekers had been entitled to social assistance until 1993.
However, their increasing number led to a steep rise in expenditure for social assistance. In order to reduce incentives to come to Germany, policy makers decided to create a new benefit specifically designed for asylum seekers. It largely builds on benefits in kind. Clearly, this legislative change related to a public debate revolving around the abuse of German social assistance and the presumably undeserving nature of the asylum seekers claiming social assistance (Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales, 2006). Other than this special benefit targeted at asylum seekers, there are no schemes intended specifically for immigrants, who therefore mostly rely on the Grundsicherung für Arbeitssuchende, the social assistance benefit for people of working age.
France introduced a programme targeted at asylum seekers, refugees and former prisoners in 1984, the allocation d'insertion (AI). In 2006, this programme was replaced with the allocation temporaire d'attante (ATA), which follows the same principles as the AI did.
The benefit is paid out to asylum seekers and refugees while they wait for their application to be processed. In other cases (e.g., former prisoners), it is limited to one year.
The UK has a separate social assistance programme for asylum seekers and their dependants since 2000.
Conditions of circumstance
In Denmark, both introduktionsydelse and starthjaelp are around 35% lower than the regular social assistance benefit kontanthjaelp. Their introduction thus meant a substantial cutback of benefits available to immigrants (Rosholm and Vejlin, 2007 The weekly rate of Income Support is around 70 GBP.
In contrast to the Danish introduktionsydelse and starthjaelp, the Swedish introduktionsersättning equals regular social assistance (ekonomiskt bistånd) in terms of benefit generosity. In France, benefit levels are also lower for immigrants than for other people. The guaranteed benefit for a single person amounts to around 320 € compared to 455 € for the regular social assistance programme revenu de solidarité active (RSA) and is thus around 30% lower. The claimant"s income is assessed against the income threshold of the RSA (thus the threshold is somewhat more generous than the very low benefit levels indicate), and the benefit can be combined with income from work for a duration of 12 months, if working hours do not exceed 78 hours a month. During the first 6 months of combining ATA with an income from work, claimants can earn up to 760,50 € without any deductions from the benefit. In the second 6 months of benefit receipt, 40% of gross work income is deducted from the benefit. If income exceeds 760,50 €, 40% of the income above this threshold is deducted from the benefit for the first 6 months, and 40% of the whole income in the second 6 months. The benefit is therefore intended to make additional work attractive (Service Public, 2011) .
Conditions of conduct
Recent immigrants to Denmark who receive the introduktionsydelse also have to take part in a three-year integration programme designed by the municipalities, usually comprising of a language course, information on Danish customs and society, and labour market activation In the UK, benefit receipt for asylum seekers is tied to compliance with the asylum support agreement, which states that claimants have to live at the accommodation provided by the asylum authorities and keep them informed about any change in their personal circumstances, including any sources of additional income. Asylum seekers are not allowed to work while they wait for their decision (UK Border Agency, 2011) . This is also true for Germany, while France favours an approach designed to facilitate labour market integration. lack of "identity", that is, the fact that they do not belong to the in-group of a "national us".
Lower benefit levels are also common, and benefit receipt may be tied to strict requirements about individual"s integration, particularly in Denmark and Sweden, where integration not only means labour market integration but also cultural integration in terms of language and customs. In order to assure this cultural integration, Denmark subdivides the group of immigrants into two categories: the newly-arrived and those who are already familiar with the country. Recipients of immigrant"s benefits are required to make a strong effort in order to demonstrate their willingness to reciprocate what their (host) society does for them in these countries. France as well seems to encourage fast labour market integration by means of generous income disregards. Germany and the UK, in contrast, do not allow asylum seekers to work until they have gained a residence permit. 
Categorical MIP schemes for people with disabilities
The institutional setup of schemes for immigrants seem to reflect their low ranking on the "universal dimension of support". According to our hypotheses, disability benefits should be influenced by the public opinion of disability being a more legitimate reason for benefit receipt than, e.g. unemployment (van Oorschot, 2006) . If so, there should be detectable evidence on each of the different levels of conditionality that were defined earlier in this chapter. Identifying a group of disabled people in need of support is only one aspect of the conditions of category. The type of disability, or its severity also define whether somebody is eligible for benefits. These facets evolved over time and may still vary across countries. Our study of disability benefits will therefore begin with a comparative look at the historical development of deservingness criteria and its consequences for the conditions of category today. These, in turn, influence the other levels of conditionality, i.e. definition of need, the nature of the means test and the behavioural conditions tied to benefit receipt, which will be discussed subsequently.
Conditions of category
The origins of categorical MIP schemes for people with disabilities can be traced back to poor relief for elderly and frail people. War victims were one of the first social groups considered as particularly deserving in several countries. Louis XIV, for example, installed special care institutions for veterans incapable of work (Didier-Courbin and Gilbert, 2005) .
The social consequences of World War I led to a formal benefit system for war victims in
France and also in other European countries, such as Germany and Austria 4 (Kaufmann, 2003) . In 1920, Ireland introduced another scheme for a specific group of disabled people, the In all cases except Germany, minimum disability benefits were institutionalized before a proper MIP scheme for the whole population came into existence. Prior to the creation of the Irish Disabled Person's Maintenance Allowance, the only financial support available for many people with impaired health was Home Assistance, a benefit that stood in the tradition of the British Poor Law and was only available on a discretionary basis. It was not until 1975
that Home Assistance was replaced by a rights-based basic allowance that was available to the whole population under the same conditions (Flora, 1987) . By that time, other categorical means-tested benefits for the more "deserving poor" already existed. Similar paths were followed by Belgium, France and Spain. In Belgium, the categorical MIP schemes for disabled and older people were established 5 years prior to the general existence minimum pensions today still have a higher legal status than general social assistance, which is regulated by the regional governments of the autonomous communities and in some regions, MIP is not a personal right of citizens, whereas minimum pensions for older and disabled people is a claimable right and subject to central state law (Rodriguez Cabrero, 2009, Laparra and Ayala, 2009 ). The German case deviates from the other countries. The civic right to social assistance (Sozialhilfe) has been an integral part of the welfare system since 1954. The road to a more differentiated MIP system in Germany was then to exclude certain groups from the general scheme. This process started with the exclusion of asylum seekers, as described above. Ten years later, in 2003, the special scheme for older and disabled people was founded.
The acknowledgement of the need to support different population groups has developed differently in the countries observed and also the view on disability within the special MIP programmes has changed over time. As a result, the level of impairment necessary in order to obtain benefit rights varies across the countries, as does the definition of disability as such. The Allocation de Remplacement de Revenus in Belgium offers income support when a person"s earnings capacity is reduced to 30% as a consequence of health problems. All other systems focus on work limitations or limitations in everyday activities directly for defining the target group. The German and Irish schemes are the strictest, granting benefits only to those who are unable to work or only able to a very limited extent. In Ireland, a person"s work incapacity must have consisted for at least a year before he or she can claim Disability Allowance. The necessary degree of impairment in France is very high, too, with 80%. There are, however exceptions for persons with a disability level of 50 to 79%, if claimants can prove that their health status is the reason for reduced chances on the labour market. The disability threshold in Spain is 65%, or 75% for an increased benefit rate ("gran invalidez"). These percentages are of course not strictly comparable, since the procedures of disability assessment vary strongly. They may, however, give a first impression on how generously access to benefits is granted.
Conditions of circumstance
With respect to the conditions of circumstance, different criteria may apply for assessing people"s needs and the extent of control they have over their situation. Schemes can differ, for example, in terms of the types of incomes and allowances that are exempt from the means test. If disabled people are seen as more deserving than the non-disabled, benefit levels should not fall below the levels of general MIP, which should act as a floor to minimum disability benefits. Overall, means-testing should be more generous than in general MIP since the dependence on mobility devices, care or medication implies a different evaluation of incomes and assets available to claimants and their relatives.
The rates for a single person in Germany (359 €), Ireland (815 €) and Belgium (741 €) are similar or close to the ones of general social assistance (MISSOC, 2011) . Only France and Spain pay significantly higher benefits to disabled persons. The Spanish benefit has a basic amount of 348 €, which is paid out 14 times a year, resulting in a monthly rate of 406 €. The "Renta Mínima de Inserción" of Madrid, which can be classified as an average Spanish social assistance system (Ayala and Rodríguez, 2007) , has a monthly rate of 376 Euro (Comunidad de Madrid, 2011) . In France, difference between benefit rates is very pronounced: The AAH"s monthly amount is 712 € while the one of the RSA is only 470 € (MISSOC, 2011). France and Spain have in common that the overall MIP system consisted solely of categorical schemes up until the late 1980s. In these two countries, the status differences between the long accepted, "deserving poor" and the "rest" seem to be quite obvious. In Belgium, Germany and Ireland, general MIP has been institutionalized as a social right for a longer time than in France and Spain. The equal benefit rates for different recipient groups in these countries might be a visible symbol for the public that the right to a subsistence minimum is in fact a citizenship right. The higher needs of people with disabilities might still be taken into account via the means test. It would, therefore, fulfil two functions with respect to deservingness criteria: First, it tests the influence of persons" disability on their level of material need, and second, the level of control the persons have on meeting these needs, not only concerning their own earnings capabilities and assets, but also in terms of their social network: Their household-and family context might be taken into account to some degree, too. This facet of the conditions of circumstance is not dependent on the medical condition of the recipient but reflects cultural norms on subsidiarity. Differences to general MIP can be interpreted as reflections of deservingness perceptions: Families might, for example, be held less responsible for providing for a disabled member than for an unemployed one.
In terms of benefit levels, France seems to be the most generous scheme, as the basic rate provided by the AAH is much higher than the one provided by general MIP. However, the policy change from the RMI to the RSA in 2009 has changed the situation for working recipients in the general scheme. Today, they are likely to be in a more favourable situation than AAH claimants now, as they can achieve the same income level without being subject to such strict income reporting rules (see "conditions of conduct") (Ministére des solidarités et de la cohésion sociale, 2011). In Spain, means testing could lead to more positive outcomes for recipients as well. This, however would not be a result of the rules applied to the pensión no contributiva but of the legal framework of general MIP, depending on the place of residence. Although non-contributory pensions are regulated on the national level, the situation of recipients might vary across regions, since some of the regional last safety nets do not take the non-contributory pensions into account in the means-test, while others leave them partly or fully untouched (García Romero et al., 2005) .
Compared with general MIP, the test is more tolerant towards work income in Belgium and Ireland while there is no difference in the treatment of earnings in Germany.
There are, however, more generous income exemption clauses for family-and household members" incomes in Germany while partners" incomes in Belgium are more strongly affected than within general MIP. In Ireland, property and assets are exempt from the 
Conditions of conduct
All benefits described are granted under the condition of a disability-or work incapacity test.
In some cases, the situation of the recipient must be reassessed after a certain period of time (e.g., after one or two years in France, depending on the case). In other cases, medical exams have to be attended on request, as in Ireland (Citizens Information Board Ireland, 2011 , Service Public, 2011 Hence, in all of the countries, the three levels of conditionality clearly interact.
Conclusion
This contribution set out to show whether the way different recipient groups are perceived may influence the institutional setup and categorical differentiation of MIP systems. In order to illustrate the potential impact of deservingness perceptions on MIP systems, benefits specifically intended for immigrants and benefits for disabled people were investigated. With regard to immigrants, many of the theoretical expectations have been confirmed. Where asylum seekers and in some instances other types of immigrants are excluded from the receipt of general social assistance, one of the arguments behind this exclusion refers to the dimension of "reciprocity", as the benefit recipients in question have not as yet paid taxes or contributed to social insurance schemes in their new country. In some cases, immigrants are further differentiated according to the aspect of "proximity" to the host countries" identity and culture. The categorical schemes for immigrants may provide lower benefit levels than the regular schemes, as is the case in Denmark, the UK, France and Germany. Of course, from the point of view of policy makers, it is important to avoid a setup of social benefits that induces "welfare tourism", that is, draws new immigrants to a particular country because of high social benefits. From the point of view of benefit adequacy, however, immigrants have to rely on benefits that theoretically are functionally equivalent to social assistance but are even less capable of avoiding poverty than the regular general MIP schemes. In some instances, benefit receipt is connected to participation in an integration programme, which can be thought of as an equivalent to activation programmes in schemes for the working-aged (native) population.
Overall, we can conclude that immigrants on MIP benefits often face a higher degree of conditionality and a lower quality of social inclusion in comparison to people who receive another categorical or general MIP benefit.
The findings for disability schemes face in the opposite direction, but interpretation is not as straight-forward. While some of them offer a high quality of social inclusion for a broadly defined population group (France, Belgium), others are more restrictive. Higher deservingness perceptions for the disabled as opposed to the unemployed are most visible in the benefit rates of France and Spain while means-testing may lead to an actual income level above general social assistance for many recipients in Ireland and Belgium. The conditions of conduct are generally related to the conditions of category, as medical exams are usually obligatory in order to establish eligibility to the benefits. In some cases, further requirements are necessary when recipients are, or wish to be, economically active. This can be interpreted as a control mechanism to ensure that those who are granted the right to these benefits do in fact deserve it.
While the empirical results do not contradict but rather confirm that deservingness perceptions may be of importance for institutional developments in both MIP schemes for immigrants and for disabled people, one should not interpret these findings as evidence for a direct causal connection. The question of how precisely public perceptions of benefit recipients influence institutional characteristics of MIP schemes remains unanswered in our paper. With regard to benefits for immigrants, similar countries have adopted very different policies. Denmark and Sweden, for example, used to be very homogenous societies. Today, Sweden has a higher level of immigration than Denmark (with around 15% of the population being of foreign origin in Sweden and less than 10% in Denmark), but in contrast to Denmark, Sweden still grants a full social assistance benefit to immigrants. Therefore, many additional factors must play a role in the institutionalization of MIP benefits in accordance with deservingness perceptions. Disability policy also offers examples that suggest more complex relations between deservingness and welfare state institutions. In three countries, the benefit levels are very low compared with social insurance, namely Belgium, Germany and
Spain. This highlights that, even if disability itself is seen as a legitimate reason for social support, reciprocity-based rights, that is, insurance contributions, are valued much stronger. In Germany, the means-test is less strict than in general social assistance, but most MIP beneficiaries in the country are receiving the benefit for unemployed people, which allows for higher work income and savings. Those who are (potentially) able to contribute to society are granted better rights. In this case, welfare state realities do not seem to match the "universal dimension of support". Future research should investigate under which circumstances policy makers install specific MIP schemes for certain groups or set up new conditions for them within existing MIP benefits. For immigrants, the degree to which the issue of immigration is politicized, including public discourse on the topic, public opinion, and, of course, party politics, is an important factor. In the case of benefits for disabled people, voluntary organizations and interest groups most likely play an important role as well as transnational actors, such as the WHO and the European Union, who increasingly gained influence on national welfare policy issues over the last decades. 3 For matters of comparability, only schemes that address the whole working age population will be compared. Benefits that concentrate on older or younger persons with disabilities will be left aside, e.g., the Dutch Wajong scheme
